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NOTES
ADMINISTRATION

OF THE WYOMING

FINANCIAL

RESPONSIBILITY

Act

Tavegia became involved in an automobile accident on a Wyoming
highway with one Burns. A report of the accident was filed with J. R.
Bromley, State High Superintendent of Wyoming, who, acting under the
Motor Vehicle Safety-Responsibility Act,1 sent Tavegia a notice giving him
ten days in which to furnish proof of financial responsibility with his
office. Tavegia failed to comply with the requirements of this notice and
fifteen days later, the superintendent issued a notice suspending Tavegia's
driver's license, his motor vehicle registration certificate and his license
plates. Tavegia. then petitioned the District Court of Weston County for
a review of the order of suspension under the provisions of the Wyo. Sess.
Laws 1947, c. 160, sec. 2b. The petition contained the facts relating to the
accident, alleged that the plaintiff was without fault, and that certain
portions of the act were unconstitutional. The defendant demurred to
the petition on the ground that the facts failed to state a cause of action.
The demurrer was overruled and when the defendant preferred to stand
upon his demurrer, judgment was given for the plaintiff. The district
court ordered that the defendant be restrained from enforcing the order
I.

Wyo. Sess. Laws 1947 c. 160, Wyo. Comp. Stat. 1945, sec. 60-1601 et. seg.
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of suspension and that Tavegia's license plates, his motor vehicle registration certificate and his driver's license be reissued. The defendant appealed
to the Supreme Court of Wyoming. Held, that since the record did not
show that the superintendent had sufficient evidence to prove that the
accident resulted in bodily injury or death or damage to the property
of any one person in excess of fifty dollars, he was not authorized to act
at all under the statute. The court, on viewing the plantiff's petition,
reached the conclusion that the plaintiff was not at fault, despite the
fact that the superintendent claimed that the district court had no authority to pass upon the merits of either the plantiff's petition or the highway
superintendent's action and that the plaintiff should be required to bring
another action to determine who was at fault, 2 and the court pointed out

that since Burns was not made a party, "that the determination made in
this case is not binding on Burns." Affirmed, Tavegia v. Bromley, 214
P. (2d) 975 (Wyo. 1950).
The main question which has been raised in regard to the effect of
the decision of the Tavegia case is whether or not the imposing of a duty
on the highway superintendent to determine fault or possible fault before
he can evoke the financial responsibility requirements has the effect of
destroying the administrative efficacy to such an extent as to prevent
adequate enforcement of the Wyoming Motor Vehicle Safety-Responsibility
Act. The attorney general's office of Wyoming designated this case as
the one which "takes the teeth out of the financial responsibility statutes,"
contending that the holding provisions of the act need not be complied
with unless actual guilt of responsibility in the accident is determined
renders the law unworkable because the effect of the decision is that the
highway superintendent is set up as a judge who has to go out and investigate the case and determine the guilt before the financial responsibility
requirements can be invoked.3 Because of a lack of funds and personnel,
it has been the contention of some that the answer to the question is an
obvious yes.
Other states, which have responsibility laws for operators of motor
vehicles, have avoided the difficulties raised by an imposing of a duty
on the administrator of their acts to determine fault prior to envoking
the financial responsibility provisions in various ways. The occurrence of
an accident, without regard to fault or a charge of fault by the highway
commissioner, has been declared sufficient to give the commissioner the
power to invoke the financial provisions of the New Hampshire financial
responsibility act. 4 By statute, the commissioner's duty to suspend only
upon a provisional judicial finding of negligence, or upon his own investigation leading to such a finding, no longer exists. The Supreme Court
of New Hampshire has stated that provisional findings of fault are inde2.
3.

Tayegia v. Bromley, (-Wyo.-) 214 P. (2d) 975, 984 (1950).
Wyoming State Tribune, February 23, 1950, p. 1, col. 1.
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Rosenblum v. Griffin, 89 N.H. 314, 197 A. 701 (1938).
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cisive and much less so are charges or claims of fault. The New York
financial responsibility act provides that the commissioner suspend the operator's license within a specified time after receiving a report of the accident
and then stipulates that the security furnished will be applicable only
to the payment of a judgment against the depositor for damages arising
out of the accident in question at law in a court of that state begun not
later than one year after the date of such accident. 5 This provision would
seem to relieve the commissioner of the duty of making a preliminary
finding of fault prior to enforcing the financial provisions of the act
inasmuch as the question of negligence would not arise until the operator
is sued for damages resulting from the accident. Wisconsin passed a
financial responsibility act in which, it is said, fault is ignored as a test
for suspension because the law pre-supposes negligence in the accident
and requires each driver or owner, as the case warrants, to comply in one
or the other statutory manner as provided for by the act. 6 The Wisconsin
statute has also been construed to provide that a determination of liability
can only be obtained in an action in which the operators involved are
parties. 7 This statute is substantially the same as the Wyoming statute,
and when the Wisconsin statute is viewed in the light of the purpose of
such statutes, to provide for financially sound drivers, it would seem to
be more acceptable than the construction which was placed on the Wyoming act by the Supreme Court of Wyoming.
Some of the states have avoided imposing such a duty on the administrator of their financial responsibility acts by basing the operation of
their laws on one or more of the following provisions: requiring proof
of financial responsibility following conviction of violating certain motor
vehicle laws; requiring proof of financial responsibility following the
non-payment of motor vehicle accident judgments; suspension of rights
to operate automobiles until there has been a satisfaction of such judgments; a provision requiring either satisfaction of judgment or proof of
ability to respond in damages for future accidents following a judgment;
requiring satisfaction of judgment and proof of financial responsibility
for future accidents following non-payment of a judgment; or requiring
that proof of financial responsibility be filed following convictions for
violations of traffic laws. 8
New Jersey requires proof of financial responsibility when any person,
while operating a motor vehicle, has been concerned in a motor vehicle
accident resulting in the death of or injury to a person, or damage to
property to the extent of at least one hundred dollars except where the
person, in the commissioner's opinion, is not at fault for causing the
accident. 9 Vermont requires proof of financial responsibility from the
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

New York Vehicle and Traffic Law, McK. Consol. Laws, Art. 6a, sec. 94e, subsecs. a
& c (1941).
(1947) Wis. L. Rev. 146.
Ibid.
3 Law & Contem. Prob. 505 (1936).
Revised Statutes of New Jersey c. 6, sec. 39:6-1 (1937).
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owper and operator of a motor vehicle which is involved in an accident
in which a person is killed or injured or from which damages to such motor
vehicle or to any othe property to the extent of seventy-five dollars or
more results when it appears to the commissioner, after a full investigation, that the operator of the vehicle was at fault. 10 These states are the
only ones found which require the administrator to make a finding of
fault before he can enforce the financial provisions of the act.
The purpose of the financial responsibility laws are to place every
person who may be found legally responsible for damages arising from an
automobile accident in a position to pay such damages and this purpose
is to be accomplished by requiring proof of ability to respond in damages
from those who may be likely to cause harm. Drivers who should be
required to be financially competent have been classified by the financial
responsibility laws; and the administrators of those acts should not be
impeded from segregating those drivers as quickly as possible. It is
therefor contended that the imposing of a duty upon an administrator
to make a provisional finding of fault before enforcing the financial
provisions of such acts runs contra to the purposes of those acts, and this
contention is supported by the fact that all but three states, which have
such laws, have seen fit not to impose such a duty upon the administrators
of their laws. The primary objective of the state is to see that the purpose
of the act is achieved and it is not to argue questions of negligence with
those persons who should be required to furnish proof of financial responsibility. However, the principal case has imposed such a duty upon
the state highway superintendent of Wyoming and because of a lack of
funds and personnel necessary to carry out this duty, the claim that the
act has been made unworkable from an administrative viewpoint cannot
be denied. The result of the decision in this case would seem to enable
an operator who has had his license revoked for failure to file proof of
financial responsibility as required by the act to file a petition to have
the order reviewed, and because the superintendent does not have the
funds or personnel to make a preliminary finding of fault, the operator
will be given a judgment on non-liability by default and the order of
suspension will be rescinded. The cure would seem to be either an increase
in funds and personnel to aid carrying out such investigations or the
elimination of fault or possible fault from the operation of the financial
responsibility act.
DAvID A. ScoTT.
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The fundamental law of damages in personal injury cases allows the
jury to fix such sum as will reasonably compensate the injured party for
10.

Public Laws of Vermont c. 213 sec. 5190 subsec. 3

(1933).

